Today, it has become trite to note that the EU interacts more and more with, and participates in an increasing number of international institutions, bodies and networks operating in the global scene. Legally, the terms in which EU law interacts with international law have been defined mostly by the Court of Justice of the European Union while interpreting and giving effect to the EU Treaties. Having secured the autonomy of the EU legal order, the Court of Justice has equally defined a set of principles and legal rules that generally ensure a rather open stance of the EU to international law, both regarding its own duties and those of the Member States.
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Specifically, administrative collaboration between public and private regulatory bodies situated at different regulatory levels (global/EU) may lead to bypassing EU procedural standards, while the effects of such collaboration may be similar to those stemming from decisions of international organizations or bodies (Section 4). Finally, the article will both summarize the main conclusions and sketch possible normative paths -constitutional, procedural, and theoretical -that could lead to preserving procedural standards at the intersection of legal systems, highlighting also their respective hurdles (Section 5).
Defining boundaries
International agreements concluded by the EU are an integral part of EU law from their entry into force. 10 According to established case law, decisions of international organizations and bodies, if directly connected to an international agreement incorporated in EU law, also form an integral part of the EU legal system from their entry into force, 11 in the same way as the agreement itself. 12 This rule has been formulated with regard to binding decisions of Association Councils acting under the Association Agreements of the EU with third countries and was subsequently developed mainly in this same area. 13 In 14 10 Haegeman (n. 2 above), paragraph 5. 11 Case 30/88, Greece v Commission 1989 E.C.R. 3733, paragraph 13. 12 Case 192/89, S.Z. Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie 1990 E.C.R. I-3497, paragraphs 8-9. The Court appears to treat such decisions as autonomous sources of international law. They will be treated as such in the discussion that follows.
However, it should be noted that whether secondary law of international organizations constitute a separate source of international law is part of an on-going discussion between international institutional lawyers (for a flavor of this 14 Sevince (n. 12 above), paragraphs 14-15, 17 and 19. 6 This finding countered previous dualist practices of the EU with regard to decisions of international bodies. decisions of bodies set up by multilateral agreements, the link between the consent of the EU and the activity of the international body is weaker. Ultimately, as underlined by Gilsdorf, the decision may be adopted against the will of the EU. 24 The EU participates in the decision-making process in a different position from the one it has in the context of bilateral agreements in general and, in particular, in the context of Association
Councils that implement Association Agreements, where it is virtually "the master of the preparation of decisions to be taken". 25 Yet, undoubtedly, the EU by concluding the agreement, consented to the procedural rules that it enshrines, including the decisionmaking rules applicable to the bodies set up by the agreement, and is therefore bound by such decisions. Independently of the possibility of raising objections with a view to avoiding undesirable constraining effects, the EU is bound by the principle pacta sunt servanda and by the consequences of its consent.
26
At a general level of analysis, the 'consent rationale' that, according to the case law of the Court of Justice, justifies the effect of decisions adopted by international organizations and bodies in the EU legal order does not apply to decisions of international organizations and bodies to which the EU is only an observer and not a member. In this case, arguably there is no link between the consent of the EU and the activity of the international body. Therefore, in principle, the EU is not legally bound by the decisions of the international organization and body to which it is merely an observer. It may, of course, wish to follow them and carry them out, within the limits of its competences, and in accordance with the values that it upholds in the international sphere (e.g. the maintenance of international peace and security, environmental protection, sustainable development, economic integration). At the same time, there may be important nuances to the logic according to which the EU is not bound by the decisions of international organizations to which it is not a member. Cases in point are those in which the Member States are bound by such decisions, because they are members of the international organization from which they stem, but their powers in the matter at issue have been transferred to the EU. This may occur, for example, with regard to the International Health Regulations issued by the World Health Organization. 27 In the famous cases of the UN Security Council resolutions on economic sanctions, the issue 24 Gilsdorf (n. 15 above), 332.
25 Kuijper (n. 17 above), 101.
26 Gilsdorf (n. 15 above), 333.
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arose whether the EU, although not being a UN member, would nevertheless be bound to pay heed to such resolutions. 28 The rule of Sevince and Deutsche Shell is in line with the openness or 'friendliness' of the EU legal order with regard to international law. 29 This general approach is, however, limited by the general principles formulated by the Court of Justice with a view to ensuring the autonomy of EU law that currently set the boundaries of the EU legal system vis-à-vis international law. On a first step, the Court of Justice shielded the EU legal order from international agreements that could negatively impact on the institutional balance defined in the Treaties as well as on the relative powers of the EU institutions. Thus, it prevented the entering into force of international agreements "likely adversely to affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties, and hence, the autonomy of the Community legal order" and, thereby, to clash with "the very foundations" of the Union. 30 The Court of Justice also established that the autonomy of EU law required "the essential character of the powers of the Community and its institutions as conceived in the Treaty to remain unaltered". 31 More recently, moving from issues of institutional balance and preservation of institutional power to substantive legal principles, the Court held that "the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty" that form part of "the very foundations of the Community legal order", among which the respect for fundamental rights, including judicial review. 32 Irrespective of the circumstances of the cases in which they were formulated -and concretely of the fact that these rules regarded, respectively, international agreements and the validity of Community acts transposing UN Security Council resolutions to EU law -these statements of the Court of Justice defined general limits to the reception of international law in the EU legal order. As such, they also limit the reception of decisions of international organizations and bodies. 
Between openness and autonomy
In between openness towards international law, on the one hand, and autonomy of the EU legal order in its external dimension, on the other, there remain unsolved issues of procedural legitimacy that may stem from the relationships between the two legal orders. This is one important aspect of the impact of international legal regimes in the EU legal order, as more acts that stand at the crossroads of international law and EU law shape the conduct of natural and legal persons, defining concrete entitlements and obligations. Their procedural protection may be ensured through rules of constitutional nature (e.g. due process in restricting fundamental rights) or through rules of administrative procedure (e.g. access to file, participation of interested persons). Both types of rules provide standards against which to measure the legitimate exercise of public authority.
The analysis below will show, through illustrative examples, the effects the incorporation of decisions of international organizations or bodies in the EU legal order may have on guarantees of participation applicable under the general rules of EU law. A previous essay has shown that two different factors explain why the interaction between global regulatory regimes and the EU legal order may ultimately lead to lower procedural standards in the segments of EU law that result from the reception of decisions of international organizations or bodies. 33 Firstly, procedural standards applicable to the making of such decisions may not be as developed as in EU law while the regulatory acts are applied in the EU legal order as they have been adopted in international fora.
Secondly, procedures followed by the EU for the adoption of legal acts of reception may not be as demanding in terms of procedural guarantees as they would be for purely internal matters.
This section will take the argument further. It will present one case where reception of decisions of international bodies has a negative impact on procedural rules valid within EU law -the reception of decisions adopted by the Fisheries Commissions law will also show that the opposite phenomenon may occur. This is important, as it
shows that the diversity of global regulatory regimes manifests itself also in this respect.
The case of CITES is, likely, exceptional in terms of guarantees of participation recognized to non-governmental bodies, for the reasons explained below, but it gives an interesting contrasting view on the effects of the interaction between EU law and international regulatory regimes on procedural standards.
In both examples, EU law incorporates the decisions of international organizations or bodies through non-legislative rulemaking. 
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It follows from the above that consultation of the RACs is an important procedural standard against which to assess both the legal and social legitimacy of fisheries management.
The RACs and the external dimension of the EU Common Fisheries Policy
In contrast to the importance attributed to the RACs within the EU Common Convention"). Moreover, it is possible that in the future other RFMOs will envisage rules on transparency that go beyond the provision of information and include provisions on participation.
80
In these cases, the role of observers is subject to relatively less constraining rules than the ones described above. 81 But the most interesting aspect of these Conventions, for current purposes, is the fact that they broaden the possibilities of participation by non-governmental interested parties -including representatives of environmental and fish industry interests -beyond their possible status as observers. 82 In two cases, the Conventions determine that the respective Fisheries Commission must promote transparency in its implementation activities, including, inter alia, decision-making that issued by national management authorities subject to pre-defined criteria. 98 In basic terms, the CITES regulatory system relies, on the one hand, on enforcement by national 111 Article XI(7) of the Convention. National non-governmental agencies or bodies must be approved for these purposes in the State in which they are located (Article XI(7)(b) 
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Committees prepare the work of the CoPs. They play a decisive role in assessing the status of the listed species and, therefore, in the review of the respective listings.
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Recognizing the "valuable contributions of observers", the CoP instructed the presiding officers at plenary and committee sessions "to make every effort to allow observers time in the sessions to make interventions while giving them a time limit for speaking if necessary". 117 In addition, it equally instructed the Secretariat "to make every effort to ensure that informative documents on the conservation and utilization of natural resources, prepared by observers for distribution at a meeting of the Conference of the Parties are distributed to the participants in the meeting". In this case, the degree of openness revealed by the CITES formal rules contrasts with the decision-making procedure followed by the EU for the adaptation of the lists of its CITES Regulation. Participation rules are absent and the flow of information seems to be purely internal (i.e. involving the Commission, the Member States and the Scientific Review Committee, which is also composed of Member States representatives). 129 The decisions for adapting the respective annexes are adopted by the Commission -or by the Council -following a comitology procedure, which, as is known, involves the opinion of a committee composed by representatives of the Member States and is chaired by a representative of the Commission. 130 The agenda and summaries of the meetings of the committee are accessible on line, this being the only information available (at least to the general public) regarding their work. 131 No opportunities for the participation of nonstate interested persons are envisaged. Admittedly, Member States representatives may individually consult NGOs on the matters that will be discussed at the meetings. But this informal lobbying, where existent, is not supported by any procedural standards and it is limited since it does not allow to directly influence the discussions held at the Committee's meetings.
Hollowing out procedural standards?
The examples above provide disparate results as to the effects that the reception of decisions adopted by international organizations or bodies in EU law may have in terms of procedural standards. At any rate, whichever the effect, observance of procedural standards is decided by the system of origin, as EU law and practice seem to "withdraw" its own standards in situations of reception. Arguably, in most cases, this will lead to a negative impact in procedural standards that would otherwise apply by force of EU Yet, the procedural rules that may be bypassed constitute procedural standards defined to legitimize the exercise of public authority. Depending on the rules at stake, they may be give effect to norms of EU law and governance now enshrined in the 
Systemic and a-systemic entry points

Medicines: ICH guidelines
The ICH is an informal transnational body, described as a "joint regulatory/industry project" and analyzed as a "public/private platform". 143 It has a mixed public and private composition. While it involves representatives from EU and State regulatory entities (Japan and the US), it is composed also of private associations representing the pharmaceutical industry in these three regions. The international process of harmonization has been driven by the pharmaceutical industry. or that modifications should be made. In any event, these need to be agreed by consensus. 151 Contrary to the practices of the EMA, there seems to be no concern regarding the feedback to be given to the participants neither public explanations on the regulatory options finally made. As such, the value of the consultation procedure remains in the shade. It is hardly possible for interested persons to assess how their contribution has impacted on the final decision.
Inclusiveness is another aspect the approval of ICH guidelines might hinder. The EMA purports to involve in its consultation procedures patients, consumers and health care professionals, mainly through their respective organizations. 152 This concern is not matched by the ICH. Even though, as mentioned, the EMA conducts the consultation on the ICH guidelines following its usual practices, the voice of parties outside the pharmaceutical industry -most likely already quite weak on such highly technical matters, however potentially relevant -is likely to fade as the regulatory process moves back to the international arena. Irrespective of how successful the EMA's efforts of 149 EMA Procedural Guidelines (n. 145, above), 17 (4.7).
150 See link quoted in note 148. 151 Step 3 of the formal procedure. harmonization" (emphasis added). While the last part of the paragraph seems to address explicitly and be tailor-made to the activity of the ICH, the latter cannot be qualified as an international organization, nor is the ICH composed only of countries. Beyond this poor drafting, one may question whether the regulatory activity of EMA within ICH is just one of providing "technical and scientific support", and therefore whether it is still upheld by the mandate given to EMA by the EU legislator. accepted in EU law and governance as standards of legitimacy against which to measure the exercise of public authority.
In this case, lower procedural standards may be coupled with shifts in public authority. Indeed, the authoritative source that justifies the reception of the decision of the international body lies outside the EU legal system and of the formally assumed international commitments of the EU. The standards of the ICH are vindicated as best practices in international expert fora, in which the Commission and the EMA represent the EU. This is their source of authority. They are accepted as best practices by the competent EU administrative entities that, therefore, incorporate them in their decisions.
Cases such as these -as well as reception of international decisions that, even if covered by EU legal rules of reception, is based on broad delegation clauses capable of encompassing virtually any decision of the EU administration (e.g. international standards and best practices must be followed) -might contribute to strengthen the weight of the executive and, in limit cases, circumvent the legislator's discretion in shaping the EU's international obligations. This clashes with the limits of reception defined by the Court of Justice, and, as a result, aggravates the legitimacy problems stemming from the reception of international decisions that depletes procedural standards otherwise applicable by force of EU law.
Preserving procedural standards: an outlook
This article has shown that the general rules that delimit the conditions under which decisions of international organizations or bodies may be received in EU law, as It follows from the analysis above that, at present, beyond the mentioned guarantees of due process, what procedural standards apply in cases of reception is a matter left to the system where the international decision originates. Therefore, it will be regulated in a variety of different ways, which may or may not match in functional terms the EU procedural standards otherwise applicable. Ultimately, this leads to a lack of consistency between the procedures followed in purely internal decision-making and those followed in decision-making that results from the reception of decisions of external actors. 156 This has more severe consequences in terms of legitimacy when regulatory acts adopted at the international level impact significantly on the legal spheres of individuals. Lack of consistency will more likely than not be detrimental to procedural rules that would otherwise be followed in internal decision-making, as in the case of Nevertheless, one ought not ignore the new facets that the Lisbon Treaty explicitly added to these principles. 160 In particular, the democratic value of transparency and participation are now clearly stated in the Treaty, in Articles 10(3) and 11 TEU, which should be read in conjunction with Article 15(1) TFEU. Moreover, procedural standards based on transparency and participation also add new dimensions to the rule of law, which is also a founding value of the EU. They unveil processes of decision-making, and thus, potentially, the relationships therein established between public decision-makers and influential private actors. As such, they create the conditions to control the exercise of public power, even if to a limited extent. This role of transparency and participation is particularly relevant in instances of exercise of authority that escape the traditional institutional controls by democratically accountable institutions typical within the state.
The procedural question
The EU legal system contains a norm that could contribute to avoiding the possible negative effects of the interaction between global regulatory regimes and EU law with regard to procedural standards. Article 218(9) TFEU determines that the position of the Union to be adopted in decision-making procedures of bodies set up by international agreements, when such procedures lead to the adoption of acts with legal effects, shall be adopted by the Council, on a proposal of the Commission or of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and upon information given to the 159 The expression "pragmatic governance" is from Gráinne Article 218(9) TFEU applies when the international body where the Union's position will be expressed adopts "acts having legal effects". The expression is ambiguous, as it raises the doubt whether it is applicable only to legally binding acts.
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However, also formally non-binding acts produce legal effects. The recommendations adopted by the CITES CoP, the legal value of which is disputable, are a case in point.
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Even if one adopts a restrictive interpretation of "acts having legal effects" as referring only to legally binding acts, a procedure analogous to the one established by Article 218(9) TFEU that would respect procedural standards could be set up under the responsibility of the Commission, on the basis of its general competence to ensure the Union's external representation under Article 17(1) TEU and in consonance with the Treaty provisions mentioned above. 165 Yet, there are obstacles in resorting to Article 218(9) TFEU (and, by extension, to
Article 17(1) TFEU, as its surrogate) with a view to preserving procedural standards.
First, the procedure defined in this provision appears to be seldom followed in practice.
Often the international positions of the Union are established informally between the 161 Article 218(9) and (10) TFEU (see also 164 See n. 100 above. 165 Hoffmeister, 48.
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Commission and the Member States, also in cases where Article 218(9) TFEU should apply. 166 As the Council itself admitted to the Court, "it is not uncommon for Community positions to be established through direct Council approval of the text on which the position is to be adopted, without an accompanying sui generis decision".
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Second, it would introduce and additional level of formality that may be incompatible with the reality of international negotiations, namely with time constraints. 168 Be that as it may, both factors only highlight possible practical obstacles, which are not sustainable in the light of the Treaty. As stressed by the Court of Justice, the fact that the Council has often ignored the procedure of Article 218(9) TFEU (former Article 300(2), second paragraph of the EC Treaty) is not a valid argument to keep on ignoring it. 169 In addition, there are limits to the level of flexibility needed in the course of international negotiations. 170 Arguably, respect for procedural standards such as transparency and participation, which have now a basis in the Treaties, ought at least to be balanced against such flexibility.
Even if such obstacles could be overcome, this solution has limitations. First, it could bind the EU to the terms of negotiation, as these would be established in the Council decision, but not to its outcomes, which in most cases will not depend on the analyzed -fisheries and medicines -structure the exercise of public authority. They were established to ensure due consideration for different competing interests involved in decision-making and, thereby, not only an accurate factual basis of decision but also improved conditions of compliance due to a better understanding of the decisions taken.
These are both conditions for achieving -or, at least, facilitating the achievement -of the substantive goals underlying each of the policies in these cases.
It may be argued that this is a purely internal problem of the EU. Furthermore, if the EU were to condition the reception of decisions of international organizations or bodies depending on whether or not they abide to procedural standards functionally equivalent to those valid within it, this would disrupt the very processes of international decision-making to an unacceptable degree. This is a valid argument. Yet, at whichever level it is exercised, "public power stands in need of legitimation and limitation" 174 and, also in the global scene, political processes have been relying more frequently on setting rules for decision-making that structure and limit the exercise of public authority.
International organizations and global regulatory bodies have sought to submit their actions to self-created standards that, at least (possibly at best, in some cases), create the appearance that they do not pursue their own interests irrespective of the public interests they proclaim (e.g. food safety, environmental protection, market or trade regulation In general terms and without further ado, one cannot claim that transparency, in the broad sense of providing access to information also on how decisions are reached, and participation beyond representation are political-legal values common to the EU and to global regulatory regimes, nor that they can be universally perceived as forms of bridging democratic shortcomings or as instruments that may facilitate the control of public authority. Not only global regulatory regimes are extremely varied, but also within the EU -as the CITES case demonstrated -such values are not followed consistently.
Furthermore, even if empirical research would allow us to identify commonly accepted procedural standards of legitimate governance, the rationale and effects of rules of transparency and participation are likely to be quite diverse across policy fields and across levels of governance, and lead to diverse degrees of involvement of the constituencies concerned. 180 Nevertheless, the fact that transparency and participation are increasingly enshrined in rulemaking procedures followed in the global setting indicates that the depletion of procedural standards inspired by such values may be a problem of legitimacy that is not uniquely a concern of the EU. What at first sight would seem to be purely an internal problem may indeed be common to the global regulatory regimes that intersect with the EU legal system. Many face legitimacy problems parallel to those that led the EU to seek for forms of "democratic supplementation" that have now made their way into the Treaties.
If ensuring procedural standards may be a concern shared by the EU and global regulatory systems, even if in varying degrees, the question follows: how can procedural divergences between interlocking legal systems be coordinated, as to preserve the procedural standards involved? A first difficulty lies in establishing whether a common understanding on values that ground procedural standards can be shared by overlapping legal systems. On which basis could conflicting legal systems operating at the global level agree on common legal yardsticks to assess the validity of their respective procedural rules? The need for such yardsticks is implicit in the very formulation of the problemthe preservation of procedural standards at the intersection of legal systems -and, yet, they are not readily available in the global setting as meta-norms that would be recognized and accepted by different jurisdictions.
One starting point to approach this hurdle would be to defend that the relationships between interlocking legal systems are content-dependent. Legal systems that receive decisions and rules adopted within other legal systems relegate such decisions and rules to an external authority. The contention that these relationships are content-dependent would stem from the assumption that, in doing so, receiving legal systems do not renounce their normative commitments, as exemplified by the Solangetype of interaction between national constitutional courts of the EU Member States and the European Court of Justice. 182 On this basis, one could seek to establish whether common political-legal values are shared by the interlocking legal systems and whether transparency and participation could be part of such "terms of engagement".
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Accepting diverging ways of giving meaning to such values would lay the ground for normative processes of recognition and revision through which one could potentially arrive at preserving procedural standards.
In sum, the acknowledgement of similar problems of procedural legitimacy shared by the EU and the global regulatory systems with which it interacts, and the assumption that the relationships between these legal systems is content-dependent could potentially leave little room to justify without further ado the depletion of procedural standards as a result of systems' interaction.
182 On content-dependent deference, see Gianluigi Palombella, 
